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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
SAFEWAY, INC., 
 
Petitioner and Defendant, 
 
v. 
 
SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, 
 
Respondent, 
 
KATHLEEN HARDIN and DANE HARDIN, 
 
Real Parties in Interest and Plaintiffs 
 
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST’S  
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
 
 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the court may consider the purpose of a health care 
provider’s alleged act or omission in distinguishing ordinary negligence 
from an injury that is “directly related to the professional services provided 
by a health care provider acting in its capacity as such.” (Central Pathology 
Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181, 191, 
192.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a corporate policy adopted by a nationwide 
grocery and pharmacy chain for the purpose of reducing costs by limiting to 
one page the prescription drug warnings given to all consumers about all 
medications. The Court of Appeal held that the action against Safeway, Inc. 
asserted only professional negligence and was therefore barred by the 
statute of limitations set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, 
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enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 
(“MICRA”). 
Plaintiff and Real Party in Interest Kathleen Hardin suffered serious 
and permanent injuries from burn-like rashes after she took the prescription 
drug Lamotrigine. Mrs. Hardin received an abbreviated one-page 
monograph from Safeway, Inc. that listed apparently benign side effects but 
failed to warn of serious, fatal or life-threatening rashes. In the trial court, 
rather than defend this conduct, Safeway, Inc. moved for summary 
judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court denied 
Safeway, Inc.’s motion based on this Court’s decision in Central 
Pathology, supra.  
The Court of Appeal in an unpublished decision issued June 19, 
2014 reversed, holding that “Safeway’s corporate decision-making” was 
professional negligence subject to MICRA protections. In the same 
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal held that the professional 
negligence claims against Safeway, Inc. and Mrs. Hardin’s physician and 
medical group were not timely under the delayed discovery provision of 
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Plaintiffs do not seek review of the 
rulings as to delayed discovery. No petition for rehearing was filed. 
On June 19, 2014, the Court of Appeal also issued a published 
decision in the same case, Hardin v. PDX, Inc. (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 
159 (hereinafter, “PDX”), which affirmed the trial court’s denial of an anti-
SLAPP special motion to strike. This petition refers to the PDX decision 
because the factual background of that appeal and this petition overlap. 
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WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED 
This case presents a new twist on a question that courts have 
grappled with since MICRA was enacted: Where does the boundary lie 
between ordinary and professional negligence for purposes of applying the 
provisions of MICRA? The same question is before the Court in Flores v. 
Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Case No. S209836, where the issue 
is whether an injury caused by negligent maintenance of a hospital bed is 
ordinary or professional negligence for purposes of MICRA. More 
particularly, the present case poses the question: in what circumstances 
would the purpose of the negligent act or omission be relevant to 
determining that boundary? 
This Court in Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181 explained that if a claim is 
for an injury that is directly related to the professional 
services provided by a health care provider acting in its 
capacity as such, then the action is one “arising out of 
the professional negligence of a health care 
provider[.]” 
(Id. at pp. 191-192.) Similarly, the Court in Central Pathology 
quoted the statutory definition used in several MICRA provisions:  
"Professional negligence" means a negligent act or 
omission to act by a health care provider in the 
rendering of professional services, . . . provided that 
such services are within the scope of services for 
which the provider is licensed . . . . 
(Id. at 187 [quoting Civil Code § 3333.2, subd. (c)(2)].) 
Based on this judicial and statutory language, some appellate courts 
(as well as the trial court in this case) have held that the purpose of a 
defendant’s conduct was relevant to determining whether the cause of 
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action was subject to MICRA’s provisions. For example, in So v. Shin 
(2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 652, 667, the court held that the doctor’s 
misconduct was not professional negligence as defined by MICRA because 
the doctor “acted for her own benefit, to forestall an embarrassing report 
that might damage her professional reputation—not for the benefit of her 
patient.” Similarly, the trial court in this case concluded that there was a 
triable issue of fact as to whether the decision to limit the length of drug 
warnings “was a business decision completely unrelated to providing 
professional services as a health care provider.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 674; 
Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court, Case No. A141505, [hereinafter “Slip 
op.”] at p. 7.) 
The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that the purpose of the 
conduct was irrelevant and that the “failure to warn Hardin of the dangers 
associated with Lamotrigine cannot be fairly characterized as anything 
other than professional negligence.” (Slip op. at p.15.) The Court of Appeal 
rejected the trial court’s “bifurcation of the claims against Safeway into 
claims of professional negligence rooted in malpractice and ordinary 
negligence, rooted in Safeway’s corporate decision-making.” (Slip op. at 
p. 14.) The appellate court relied on cases in which the asserted negligence 
occurred in a hospital or doctor’s office during the course of treatment of 
plaintiff. Such cases are fundamentally different from the facts of this case. 
Here, the alleged negligence did not occur at a health care facility. It 
occurred at Safeway, Inc.’s corporate headquarters long before Mrs. Hardin 
was injured and far from her local pharmacy.  
The evidence in the trial court showed that the pharmacist who filled 
Mrs. Hardin’s prescription had no role in deciding the content of the 
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monograph. It was undisputed that the pharmacist’s role was limited to 
pushing a button that caused the monograph to print. The content of the 
monograph – and of importance here, what it omitted – was dictated by a 
corporate policy to use less paper and shorten monographs. This decision 
was made by executives who had no role in dispensing Mrs. Hardin’s 
prescription and were unaware of the contents of the Lamotrigine 
monograph until this lawsuit was filed. 
As a result of the appellate decisions in this case, the software 
company, PDX, Inc., may be held liable for its alleged negligence in 
modifying its software (at the request of Safeway, Inc.) to produce only 
abbreviated drug monographs. Safeway, Inc., however, may not be held 
liable for its own similar conduct, namely using PDX’s software that it 
knew and intended would produce monographs that omitted drug warnings 
for all of its pharmacy customers nationwide. 
This Court should grant review to provide guidance as to whether 
the purpose of the conduct – whether to deter a patient from complaining 
about care (as in So, supra) or to improve profits (as in this case) – may be 
relevant and important to the determination of whether negligent conduct 
was “directly related to the professional services provided by the health 
care provider acting in its capacity as such.” 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Drug Information that Safeway, Inc. Provided to 
Mrs. Hardin Did Not Warn Her of the Serious Risks 
Associated with Lamotrigine. 
Plaintiff Kathleen Hardin worked full-time as the librarian in charge 
of the slide collection at the University of California, Santa Cruz until she 
was stricken by the disabling and disfiguring injuries that are the subject of 
this litigation. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 225.) On March 31, 2010, Mrs. 
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Hardin’s primary care physician prescribed a new medication, Lamotrigine, 
for depression. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 228-229, 287.) Her doctor did not tell 
Mrs. Hardin about the potential risks or side effects associated with the 
drug. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 231-232, 251, 439-441.) 
After her check-up, Mrs. Hardin went to a Safeway Pharmacy in 
Santa Cruz to fill the Lamotrigine prescription. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 235, 
306; Safeway Pet. ¶ 6.) With her prescription she received a one-page 
computer print-out (referred to as a monograph) that had the Safeway, Inc. 
name and logo and that also included her name and other personal 
information. She received no other written material about the prescription, 
and the Safeway pharmacist did not orally provide any information or 
warnings about Lamotrigine. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 235, 237, 263, 270, 
306.)  
Before taking Lamotrigine, Mrs. Hardin read the monograph and 
believed it contained the information she needed to know about the drug. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 237-239, 265-266.) The monograph that Safeway 
printed for Mrs. Hardin mentioned some side effects, such as allergic 
reactions, that sounded “benign” to Mrs. Hardin. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 
306; Safeway Pet. ¶ 9.) The monograph she received did not mention 
Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (SJS), Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TENs), 
serious rashes, fatal rashes, or rashes that could become life threatening 
even if the medication were stopped. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 306, Safeway 
Pet. ¶ 10.) Mrs. Hardin began taking Lamotrigine on April 2, 2010. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 242, 288.)  
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B. Three Weeks After Starting the Drug, Mrs. Hardin Was 
Hospitalized with a Severe Case of Stevens-Johnson 
Syndrome Caused by Lamotrigine. 
On April 25, 2010, Mrs. Hardin began to experience a general 
feeling of malaise. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 311.) The next day, Mrs. Hardin 
remembered calling in to tell work she was not feeling well. The next thing 
she remembered was waking up in the hospital in June 2010. (Safeway 
Exs., vol. 2, 275, 285-286.) She had been diagnosed with SJS and TENs 
and had spent more than a month in a coma while these conditions caused 
her internal organs to fail. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 275.) When Mrs. Hardin 
came out of the coma, she underwent rehabilitation, including speech 
therapy, physical therapy, occupational therapy and wound treatment. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 255.) She remained hospitalized until July 16, 2010. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 256.) Due to severe scar damage to her eyes, 
including perforation and melting of her cornea, she could only sense 
lightness and darkness. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 254, 258.) 
C. Safeway, Inc. Corporate Headquarters Decided to Modify 
Its Software so that the Safeway Pharmacies Would Only 
Print Abbreviated Monographs. 
Drug monographs “are produced as part of a self-regulating action 
plan required under public law as approved by the Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services.” (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. 
App. 4th at p.162.) After this statute1 was enacted, a committee of 
pharmacists, physicians, pharmaceutical companies, industry associations 
and consumer advocates drafted and issued the “Action Plan for the 
Provision of Useful Prescription Medicine Information” (“Action Plan” or 
“Keystone Criteria”). (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 447-478.) “The goals [of the 
1 Pub. L. No. 104-180 (Aug. 6, 1996) 110 Stat. 1593. 
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Keystone Criteria] were to improve the quality of information, and thereby 
reduce injury.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 391.)  
The monograph for each drug was divided into standardized 
sections. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 389-390.) In 1997, three additional sections 
were added to the five standard sections previously included in each drug 
monograph. The three new sections had the headings: “Before Using This 
Medicine,” “Overdose,” and “Additional Information.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 
2, 390.) “The ‘Before Using This Medication’ section contains warnings 
about taking the drug that may include warnings about drug interactions or 
complications due to coexisting medical conditions.” (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. 
App. 4th at p.163.)  
Safeway, Inc. used software created by PDX, Inc. to assemble and 
automatically print monographs and labels for pharmacy customers 
throughout North America. (Id. at pp.162-163.) When any Safeway 
Pharmacy filled a prescription, the pharmacist would hit a button and the 
PDX software automatically printed the monograph attached to a label with 
the customer’s personal information. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 323-325.) The 
monograph was given to the customer along with his or her prescription. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 323.)  
From 1997 until 2005, PDX software allowed Safeway, Inc. the 
option of printing an abbreviated version of the drug monograph that 
omitted the three sections that had been added in 1997, including the 
“Before Using This Medicine” section. (Ibid.) In June 2004, PDX urged its 
customers (including Safeway, Inc.) to “PRINT ALL MONOGRAPH 
SECTIONS” in order to comply with the Keystone Criteria. (Safeway Exs., 
vol. 2, 403). On December 17, 2004, PDX sent its customers (including 
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Safeway, Inc.) a memorandum stating that in order to comply with the 
Action Plan, PDX was going to eliminate the option of printing abbreviated 
monographs. With the new version of the software, the complete eight-
section monograph “will always print.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 391, 405.) 
PDX informed Safeway and other customers: “Using the abbreviated 
option does not comply with the content requirements of the Keystone 
Criteria.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 405.) At the same time, PDX warned “this 
will require additional space for the monographs being printed and may 
result in a higher incidence of two page monographs.” (Ibid.) In 2005, the 
PDX software update took effect and Safeway, Inc. was temporarily 
compelled to print complete monographs for all drugs and all customers. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 391.)  
In 2006, after PDX made printing all eight sections mandatory, a 
corporate representative of Safeway contacted PDX to request that the 
company revise the software so that Safeway could again print the five 
section monographs as before. (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th at p. 163.) 
PDX and Safeway, Inc. entered into a written contract on November 29, 
2006, providing that PDX would modify the software for Safeway, Inc. to 
print the abbreviated five-section monographs for all medications and all 
customers. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 392, 407-410.) As stated by Safeway, 
Inc.’s Manager of Business Applications, Spencer Dowell (who signed the 
contract with PDX): the software company “provided a solution” to the 
problem of longer monographs. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 326.) 
The contract between PDX and Safeway, Inc. acknowledged that 
PDX had updated its software in 2005 to print only eight-section 
monographs “to assist in complying with [the] requirements” of the Action 
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Plan. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 407.) In addition, PDX and Safeway, Inc. 
agreed that the purpose of the Action Plan was to provide information to 
consumers to enable them “to use the medication properly and 
appropriately, receive the maximum benefit and avoid harm.” (Ibid.) The 
contract also included a provision by which Safeway, Inc. agreed to 
indemnify PDX for any claims that might arise from the shortening of any 
monograph. (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th at p.163.)  
Lamotrigine had a known risk of SJS, TENs, and fatal rashes, but the 
“abbreviated warning utilized by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted 
what is referred to as the ‘Black Box’ warning . . . that stated: ‘SERIOUS 
AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY 
WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE.’” (PDX, supra, 227 Cal. App. 4th 
at p.163.) A black box warning (also called a “boxed warning”) was the 
strongest warning that the FDA could require. It meant that medical studies 
showed a significant risk of serious or life-threatening adverse effects from 
the drug. (21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (c)(1).)  
D. The Decision to Use Abbreviated Monographs Was Made 
by the Safeway, Inc. Corporate Executive Responsible for 
the Profitability of the Pharmacies Nationwide. 
Safeway, Inc. conceded that the decision to shorten the monographs 
was made in 2006 by David Fong at Safeway, Inc.’s corporate office. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 1, 36; Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 332.) From 2005 to 2010, 
Mr. Fong held the titles of “Senior Vice President and GM, Pharmacy, 
Health and Wellness” and “Senior Vice President of Pharmacy.” (Safeway 
Exs., vol. 2, 371.) He oversaw 1,200 pharmacies in the U.S. and Canada. 
(Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 348.)  
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Mr. Fong was responsible for the profitability of the business unit 
called “Pharmacy.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 345.) A written job description 
stated that the Safeway, Inc. senior VP/GM of pharmacy was “responsible 
for increasing shareholder value,” and the incumbent should “[c]ontinually 
develop ways to measure, define, interpret, and report on department 
metrics including wage controls, sales margin, department net gain and 
work to optimize program efficiencies (Six Sigma Lean certification) and 
increased performance.” (Safeway Exs. vol. 2, at 384.) He reviewed 
financial statements to identify contributors to the overall profitability of 
the pharmacy business unit, and determine where Safeway, Inc. could 
“optimize” sales and/or reduce costs. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2,  345-347, 356.) 
He tracked expenditures on accounting reports. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 366.) 
In order to increase profits, Mr. Fong considered expenditures such as 
salaries of pharmacy personnel, lights in the building, technology, and 
importantly, supplies, which included vials, prescription labels, and printer 
paper. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 358-359.)   
Mr. Fong never worked filling prescriptions behind the counter at a 
Safeway Pharmacy. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 360, 349.) Mr. Fong did not 
dispense medications, medication labels, or product information to 
customers. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 344, 349.) Nor did Mr. Fong perform any 
other work of a pharmacist, and his position did not require him to be a 
licensed pharmacist (although he was one). (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 331, 333, 
378.)  
Mr. Fong also did not oversee how the Safeway pharmacies 
provided information to customers or attempt to ensure that information 
provided to customers was complete and accurate. He relied on 
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manufacturers to do so. He never read any of the monographs printed for 
Safeway customers using PDX software. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 363-365.) 
He also did not recall ever having gone to a pharmacy to have someone 
show him how the PDX software worked. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 353-354.) 
After leaving his position at Safeway, Inc., Mr. Fong eventually went to 
work for PDX. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 371.) 
Spencer Dowell, Safeway, Inc.’s Manager of Business Applications, 
implemented the decision by Mr. Fong to shorten all drug monographs. 
Before this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Dowell had never reviewed a 
Lamotrigine monograph. (Safeway Exs., vol. 2, 323.) 
In the trial court, Safeway, Inc. provided no evidence in its moving 
papers that the decision by Mr. Fong to modify the PDX software and 
shorten all monographs for all drugs was based on any consideration related 
to the rendering of healthcare services to pharmacy customers. Safeway, 
Inc., merely contended that the 2006 policy decision “to use the form of 
monograph received by Plaintiff Kathleen Hardin was made by two 
licensed Safeway pharmacists [Mr. Fong and Mr. Dowell] within 
Safeway’s Pharmacy Division” (Safeway Exs., vol. 1, 206.)  
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
THE PURPOSE OF A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER’S ACT OR 
OMISSION MAY BE HIGHLY RELEVANT TO WHETHER THE 
CONDUCT WAS ORDINARY OR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE. 
The trial court in this case held that there were disputed facts as to 
whether the MICRA statute of limitations applied to Safeway, Inc.’s 
omission of FDA-approved warnings from its Lamotrigine monograph. As 
the trial court ruled, a pharmacy “might be considered a health care 
provider pursuant to MICRA in some circumstances [but] the court does 
not find that [Safeway, Inc.] is a health care provider for purposes of 
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MICRA under all circumstances.” (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 673.) In other 
words, “not every act of negligence by a professional is an act of 
professional negligence, even where the victim is a client[.]” (Bellamy v. 
Appellate Dep’t (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 797, 803 [quoting Murillo v. Good 
Samaritan Hospital (1979) 99 Cal. App. 3d 50, 56].)  
The Court of Appeal did not conclude that a negligent act that 
injured a patient must necessarily be professional negligence. But it held 
that the trial court had erred in considering the reason for the conduct, 
whether based on business or medical concerns. The appellate court 
analogized Mrs. Hardin’s claim to cases involving negligent or 
unintentional conduct during treatment, such as the hypothetical “bump of a 
janitor’s broom” that may have disconnected a hospital ventilator2 or the 
failure to secure a patient to a bed while taking an x-ray.3 In these cases, it 
was fairly obvious that the defendants were rendering some service to 
plaintiff at the time of the injury. But were they professional services? The 
courts in those cases decided that they were. 
The claim against Safeway, Inc. is different. In this case, the 
negligent conduct – adopting a policy (implemented with the participation 
of PDX, Inc.) to reduce paper use by printing only five-out-of-eight 
monograph sections – occurred years before plaintiff’s injury, in a different 
location, and involved actors who had no knowledge of Mrs. Hardin or 
Lamotrigine before this lawsuit. When he made the decision in 2006, Mr. 
Fong was not providing services to any pharmacy customer. To determine 
2 Taylor v. United States (9th Cir. 1987) 821 F.2d 1428, 1432. 
3 Bellamy, supra, 50 Cal. App 4th at 808. 
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whether this decision related to the “rendering of professional services,” it 
is logical and necessary to consider the purpose of the underlying conduct. 
As the trial court ruled, Safeway’s motion failed because “triable 
issues of fact exist as to whether these actions were ‘directly related to the 
professional services provided by a health care provider acting in its 
capacity as such.’” (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 674 [quoting Central Pathology 
Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 181, 191].)  
Other cases have considered purpose or motive to decide this 
question. For example, when an anesthesiologist, motivated by her self-
interest, threatened a patient to deter her from reporting negligent medical 
care, the doctor was not “rendering professional services” that were subject 
to MICRA. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 652.) Similarly, when a 
doctor motivated by his own gratification had sexual relations with a 
patient during treatment, that was not deemed the rendering of professional 
services and did not give rise to a claim for professional negligence. 
(Atienza v. Taub (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 388, 392-394.) 
In this case there are triable issues of fact as to whether Safeway, 
Inc. modified its software for the purpose of rendering professional services 
or to improve its bottom line by using less printer paper.  
A. Safeway, Inc. Failed to Establish as a Matter of Law an 
Essential Element of its Statute of Limitations Defense. 
The MICRA statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 340.5 applies if the claim is for the “rendering of professional 
services . . . for which the provider is licensed.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5.) 
Safeway, Inc. did not carry its burden of establishing this element. 
Safeway, Inc. did not modify its software to omit important drug warnings 
in the “rendering of professional services . . . for which [it] is licensed.” To 
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the contrary, the record suggests that Safeway, Inc.’s purpose in omitting 
the warnings and printing shorter monographs was to improve profits.4  
B. So v. Shin Recognized that the Purpose Underlying a 
Health Care Provider’s Conduct Was Relevant to 
Determining Whether the Claim Involved Ordinary vs. 
Professional Negligence.  
Case law has recognized that misconduct by a health care provider is 
not necessarily professional negligence, even when the misconduct occurs 
over the same period of time that medical services are provided. Rather, 
professional negligence may only arise from conduct that is “for the 
purpose of delivering medical care to a patient.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal. 
App. 4th 652, 666-67.) “[T]ortious actions undertaken for a different 
purpose . . . are not” professional negligence. (Id.) In this case, too, 
considering the reason for the software modification would be relevant to 
determining whether the conduct was for the purpose of rendering 
professional services or was an ordinary and usual part of a pharmacist’s 
services. 
In So, the defendant administered anesthesia to plaintiff during a 
dilation and curettage procedure. As a result of insufficient anesthesia, 
plaintiff woke up with pain and discomfort during the procedure. (Id. at 
p.657.) After the procedure, while still in the recovery room, plaintiff asked 
Dr. Shin why she had woken up during the procedure. Dr. Shin became 
upset, shoved a container holding plaintiff’s blood and tissue at her, and 
told her not to tell anyone that she had woken up. (Id. at p.657-658.) 
4 Section 340.5 also requires that the defendant be a “health care 
provider” licensed or certified under California law. Safeway, Inc. also 
failed to produce uncontested evidence that its corporate headquarters was 
– or under the law, could be – licensed by the State Board of Pharmacy. 
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In considering whether plaintiff’s claim against the anesthesiologist 
was “professional negligence” for purposes of the statute of limitations, the 
court in So stated that physician misconduct is “not necessarily professional 
negligence—even where, as here, the misconduct occurs ‘over the same 
period of time’ that medical services are provided.” (Id. at p.666.) 
Rather, professional negligence is only that negligent conduct 
engaged in for the purpose of (or the purported purpose of) 
delivering health care to a patient—or, in the words of our 
Supreme Court in Central Pathology, conduct “directly related to 
the professional services provided by a health care provider acting 
in its capacity as such” and that “is an ordinary and usual part of 
medical professional services.” (Id. at pp.666-667.) 
For example, the Court noted, “tortious actions undertaken . . . for 
the physician’s sexual gratification—are not” acts for the purpose of 
delivering health care. (Id. at pp.667-668 [citing Atienza v. Taub (1987) 194 
Cal.App.3d 388].) Similarly, the So Court concluded that Dr. Shin’s 
conduct was not for the purpose of rendering health care: 
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Shin engaged in the 
alleged tortious conduct for the purpose of persuading plaintiff not 
to report to the hospital or medical group that plaintiff had 
awakened during surgery. In other words, plaintiff alleges that Dr. 
Shin acted for her own benefit, to forestall an embarrassing report 
that might damage her professional reputation — not for the 
benefit of her patient. (Id. at p.667.) 
The only evidence Safeway submitted with its moving papers in 
support of its contention that the software modification was for the purpose 
of rendering professional services was the fact that Mr. Fong was a licensed 
pharmacist. (Safeway Exs., vol. 1, 206.) That is irrelevant. Mr. Fong’s 
position as the executive overseeing all Safeway pharmacies did not require 
a pharmacist license. More importantly, as So held, the purpose of the 
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conduct was determinative, not the defendant’s licensure. (So, supra, 212 
Cal. App. 4th at pp.666-667.)  
Similarly, Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal. App. 
3d 1106 held that the licensure of the actor does not determine whether the 
conduct was professional negligence. Natividad involved both negligence 
claims against individual physicians and a claim under Government Code 
section 845.6 based on the failure by state employees – some of whom were 
physicians – to summon medical care. Natividad held that MICRA did not 
apply to the failure-to-summon claim because “the true nature of the action 
against the State” was not “one for professional negligence” simply because 
“fortuitously, the employees who failed to summon assistance were 
doctors.” (Id. at pp. 1116-1117.) Nor was the state operating as a “health 
care provider” as defined in MICRA. (Ibid.) 
It is telling that in its motion for summary judgment, Safeway 
presented no evidence that it considered any reason founded in medicine or 
patient care for this decision. It is hard to imagine that a pharmacist 
involved in rendering professional services to a patient would omit FDA-
approved warnings of “serious and sometimes fatal rashes” from a 
monograph – while nonetheless providing information about less serious 
side effects, such as allergic reactions. As the trial court ruled: “Logically, 
the decision [to modify the software] does not appear to have been directly 
related” to the rendering of professional services. (Safeway Exs., vol. 3, 
674.)  
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C. The Court of Appeal Relied on Factually Inapposite Cases 
Involving Unintentional or Accidental Conduct in the 
Course of Professional Treatment. 
The Court of Appeal inaptly analogized Safeway’s decision to 
modify software across its North American pharmacy business to cases 
involving accidental occurrences during the immediate and direct provision 
of health care. It did not matter in these cases whether the negligent conduct 
involved skilled or unskilled services or were rendered by licensed or 
unlicensed personnel – it was all deemed professional negligence. In those 
cases, the conduct was closely related – in time, place and purpose – to the 
provision of services to a specific plaintiff. 
The cases on which the Court of Appeal relied explain that in the 
course of medical treatment, doctors and other professionals “perform a 
variety of tasks” and “[s]ome of those tasks may require a high degree of 
skill and judgment, but others do not.” (Bellamy, supra, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 
808.) “Each, however, is an integral part of the professional service being 
rendered.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in another case the court cited, a government 
hospital “had a professional duty to prevent Taylor’s husband from 
becoming separated from his ventilator, regardless of whether separation 
was caused by the ill-considered decision of a physician or the accidental 
bump of a janitor’s broom.”  (Taylor v. United States (9th Cir. 1987) 821 
F.2d 1428, 1432.) 
These cases, however, do not resolve the issue of whether Safeway, 
Inc.’s corporate decision to reduce the amount of paper it used was ordinary 
or professional negligence. In this case, the evidence showed that the Santa 
Cruz Safeway Pharmacy (where Mrs. Hardin filled her prescription) and the 
pharmacists who worked there had no role in deciding the content of the 
monographs. Safeway, Inc. did not dispute that the local pharmacist’s role 
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in producing the monograph was limited to pushing a button that caused the 
document to print. The content of the monograph – and of importance here, 
what it omitted – was dictated by a corporate policy to shorten all 
monographs and thereby use less paper. 
It is clear that the failure to warn Mrs. Hardin was no accident. It 
was the result of a deliberate decision that affected customers at all 1,200 
Safeway, Inc. pharmacies in North America. The appellate court decision 
identified nothing in the record linking this decision to the rendering of 
professional services to Mrs. Hardin. In order to conclude that this conduct 
was “inextricably interwoven” with delivering competent medical care to a 
patient,5 the court in a case such as this one should consider the reason for 
the conduct.  
D. The Court of Appeal’s Reliance on Flowers Was 
Misplaced. 
The Court of Appeal stated that there can be only one standard of 
care, and therefore Safeway cannot be liable both for ordinary negligence 
(based on its corporate decision to modify the software) and for 
professional negligence (based on the failure of its pharmacists to counsel 
and provide information to Mrs. Hardin). That is not true. As this Court has 
recognized, “many malpractice actions will be pursued both on MICRA 
and non-MICRA theories.” (Waters v. Bourhis (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 424, 437 
fn. 13.) Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 992 – cited by the Court of Appeal at page 15 of the slip opinion – 
does not hold otherwise. In Flowers, the plaintiff alleged both ordinary and 
5 See Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 
1051.  
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professional negligence based on a single omission: the failure to raise a 
safety rail that allowed plaintiff to fall off a gurney. The Court held that this 
conduct must be judged by a single legal standard. That holding has no 
bearing on the multiple claims in this lawsuit, which are based on distinct 
conduct that occurred years apart, was carried out by different Safeway 
employees, in different locations, and for different reasons.  
E. Safeway, Inc. Had the Burden of Proof to Establish the 
Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations. 
The Court of Appeal in finding that the MICRA statute of limitations 
barred the action erroneously applied the rule that for purposes of summary 
judgment, “the pleadings set the boundaries of the dispute.” (Slip op. at p. 
14.) This rule applies when the moving party seeks summary judgment on 
the ground that “plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause 
of action.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853–
854.) As the opposing party, the plaintiff must direct any opposition 
evidence toward the issues raised by the pleadings. (Distefano v. Forester 
(2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265.) “It is not appropriate, at that 
time, to raise new legal theories or claims not yet pleaded, if there has been 
no request for leave to amend accordingly, prior to the summary judgment 
proceedings.” (Ibid.) 
Safeway, Inc. did not attempt to show that the Mrs. Hardin was not 
injured by the negligent failure to warn her of the known risks of 
Lamotrigine. Instead, the motion was based on the affirmative defense of 
statutes of limitations. When the defendant moves for summary judgment 
on this basis, the defendant bears both the initial burden of production and 
the burden of persuasion that the limitations period has expired. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The “initial burden of production [requires the 
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defendant] to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable 
issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a 
shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of 
his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of 
material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) 
The ultimate burden here was on Safeway, Inc. to show based on 
undisputed evidence that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 barred the 
negligence cause of action.  First, however, Safeway, Inc. had to make a 
prima facie showing that the cause of action was based on the “rendering of 
professional services . . . for which the provider is licensed.” (Code Civ. 
Proc. § 340.5.)  
The only undisputed evidence in the record relevant to Safeway, 
Inc.’s affirmative defense was that (1) Mr. Fong, who happened to be a 
licensed pharmacist, was responsible for the corporate policy of using 
abbreviated monographs; and (2) the local pharmacy and pharmacist who 
dispensed Lamotrigine to Mrs. Hardin were also licensed. Based on the 
complete record, the trial court found that Safeway, Inc. had failed to meet 
its burden of showing through undisputed evidence that the MICRA statute 
of limitations applied.  
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CONCLUSION 
This case raises issues that are important to both health care 
providers and patients. The Court should clarify when and how evidence of 
the purpose of the conduct may be relevant to distinguishing professional 
from ordinary negligence. This is a recurrent challenge for courts, as shown 
by Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, another case now 
pending in this Court. For this reason, the Court should grant review of this 
case. 
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 Due to side effects of a drug prescribed by her physician, real party Kathleen 
Hardin sustained severe and debilitating injuries.  She alleged she was not warned 
of these potential, serious side effects of the medication by her doctor, petitioner 
Sharon S. Jamieson, M.D., the medical practice that employs Jamieson—petitioner 
Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group, Inc. [Medical Group], or by the dispensing 
pharmacy, petitioner Safeway, Inc.  Hardin, together with her husband, real party 
Dane Hardin (Dane),1 sued various defendants, including petitioners, for 
negligence and loss of consortium.  Petitioners brought separate motions for 
summary judgment, based on their contention that the complaint was untimely.  
The superior court denied Jamieson’s and the Medical Group’s summary judgment 
motions, finding there were triable issues of fact regarding the delayed discovery 
by Hardin of the cause of her injuries.  The court also denied Safeway’s motion for 
summary judgment, in part, due to Hardin’s delayed discovery of the cause of her 
injuries and, in part, because it was not established that in all relevant respects, 
Safeway was a health care provider pursuant to the Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act [MICRA] entitled to protection of the statute of limitations for 
professional negligence.   
 Petitioners each filed timely petitions for writ of mandate in this court.  For 
purposes of this decision only, we consolidate these petitions because they are 
based on a common set of facts.  There are no material disputed facts concerning 
the applicability of the statute of limitations.  We conclude that Hardin and her 
                                              
 1For ease of reference and to avoid confusion, we will refer to Mr. Hardin by his 
first name.  We intend no disrespect. 
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husband knew her injuries were caused by her adverse reaction to medication in 
June 2010.  Her complaint was not filed within one year of her discovery and is 
barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.  We also conclude that Safeway 
was acting as a health care provider in the events alleged in Hardin’s complaint 
and entitled to the limitations period in section 340.5.  We direct the superior court 
to vacate its orders denying summary judgment and to issue new and different 
orders granting the summary judgment motions in favor of each petitioner.   
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Hardin was generally under the care of Jamieson, her primary care 
physician, from sometime in 2002 through June 29, 2011.  On March 31, 2010 
Jamieson prescribed a new medication, Lamictal, for Hardin without discussing 
any of the potential risks or side effects associated with the drug.  Hardin filled the 
prescription with Lamotrigine, the generic form of Lamictal, at a Safeway 
pharmacy in Santa Cruz.  She received a one-page computer print-out at the 
pharmacy which discussed some possible side effects of the drug such as allergic 
reactions.  The print-out did not mention Stevens-Johnson Syndrome (SJS), Toxic 
Epidermal Necrolysis (TENs) or other serious or life-threatening risks.  The 
pharmacist gave Hardin no verbal or supplemental warnings other than the 
computer print-out.  Hardin began taking 25 milligrams per day on April 2, 2010, 
and gradually increased the dosage.  On April 21, 2010, Jamieson wrote her a new 
prescription for 100-milligram tablets.  When Hardin filled this second prescription 
she received from Safeway an identical print-out concerning Lamotrigine that she 
had previously received.  Again she received no verbal or supplemental warnings.   
 On April 25 Hardin began to experience a sense of malaise.  The next day 
she called her work to inform them that she was not well.  She has no further 
memories of what happened until she awoke in the hospital in June 2010.  The day 
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after Hardin remembers calling work, her husband, Dane, took her to urgent care in 
Santa Cruz because her condition seemed to be deteriorating.  She had small 
blotches on her face and chest, and her eyes were bloodshot.  The next day she was 
hospitalized at Dominican Hospital, where she went into a coma.  She was 
diagnosed with SJS, a condition that causes internal and external burn-like rashes.  
On April 28, 2010 she was transferred to the burn unit of the Santa Clara Valley 
Medical Center, where she was in a coma from April 28 until sometime in June 
2010, while SJS and TENs2 caused organ failure.  On July 16, 2010, when 
discharged from the hospital in Santa Clara, Hardin still had open wounds and was 
virtually blind, able only to sense light and dark.   
 Hardin testified that once she awoke from the coma she was told in June 
2010 that she had SJS and TENs and that those conditions were caused by 
Lamotrigine.  She did not know, however, whether the conditions were common 
complications from Lamotrigine or had been reported in the literature.  Dane, on 
the other hand, had researched the side effects of Lamotrigine and learned on April 
27, 2010, that SJS was a potential side effect, after his wife was seen in the Urgent 
Care Clinic and was instructed to stop taking the medication immediately.  Also, in 
April 2010 Dr. Berger, a physician at the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, 
informed Dane that his wife’s SJS was due to Lamotrigine.  In June 2010 Dane 
told his wife that she had developed SJS due to the Lamotrigine.   
 On July 19, 2011 the Hardins consulted an attorney to find out if 
pharmaceutical companies had a fund to pay for medical expenses related to 
adverse drug reactions.  The attorney informed them that he was unaware of any 
such fund, but suggested they consult other counsel to investigate whether they had 
a viable claim of medical malpractice.  It was only after this meeting that Hardin 
                                              
 2TENs is a life-threatening skin condition in which the top layer of skin, the 
epidermis, detaches from the lower layers, dermis, all over the body. 
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learned that SJS, TENs and serious and fatal rashes were known risks associated 
with Lamotrigine.  Indeed, she learned sometime after July 2011 that the Food and 
Drug Administration required “boxed warnings” for Lamotrigine concerning the 
possibility that SJS and “life threatening rashes” might be caused by the drug.  A 
“boxed warning” is the strongest warning the FDA can require and signifies that studies 
show a significant risk of serious or life-threatening adverse effects from taking the drug.  
(21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1).)  Boxed warnings were omitted from the print-outs Hardin 
had been provided by Safeway.   
 The printouts Safeway provided were products of software created by PDX, 
Inc., which Safeway used to provide patients with monographs containing useful, 
accurate, and comprehensive information about prescription drugs, including the 
appropriate warnings.  Prior to 2005, PDX’s software enabled its licensees to print 
out either the long (eight-section) or short (five section) version of the monograph 
for any given drug.  The short version excluded sections under the headings 
“Before Using This Medication,” “Overdose,” and “Additional Information.”  The 
“Before Using This Medication” section contained warnings about taking the drug 
that may include warnings about drug interactions or complications due to 
coexisting medical conditions.  In 2005, in response to regulatory guidelines, PDX 
revised its software so that it would no longer print the abbreviated monographs.  
For reasons not clear from the record, Safeway did not want to utilize the full 
eight-section monographs and asked PDX to revise its software so that Safeway 
could continue to print only the five-section versions.  PDX complied with that 
request after it obtained a release of liability and indemnity agreement from 
Safeway.  Safeway’s decision to use the abbreviated monographs was made by 
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David Fong, Safeway’s senior vice president of pharmacy, who oversaw 1,200 
Safeway pharmacies and was responsible for their profitability.3    
 When it denied the Medical Group’s and Jamieson’s summary judgment 
motions the court wrote, in part: 
“Plaintiffs have raised triable issues of fact as to whether they are 
entitled to apply the ‘discovery rule’ for delayed accrual of the claims 
as to Defendant.  ‘The discovery rule provides that the accrual date of 
a cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury 
and its negligent cause.’  (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1998) 44 Cal.3d 
1103, 1109.) 
 
While it is undisputed that Plaintiffs were aware that Kathleen’s 
injuries were caused by Lamotrigine, it does not appear that they 
suspected that Dr. Jamieson, or Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group 
. . . contributed to the injuries she sustained in early 2010.  Indeed, 
Sharon S. Jamieson, M.D. was Kathleen’s primary care physician 
from 2002 until June 2011. . . . The fact that Plaintiffs continued to 
trust Kathleen’s medical care to Dr. Jamieson and PAFMG strongly 
suggests a level of trust that indicates Plaintiffs had no idea that either 
defendant may have contributed to her injury or that her injury was 
caused by wrongdoing.  Triable issues of fact exist as to whether the 
confidential and fiduciary relationship of physician and patient 
excused Plaintiffs from greater diligence in determining the cause of 
Kathleen’s injury. . . . 
 
Still further, triable issues of fact exist as to whether a reasonable 
person would have suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing.  
It cannot be determined as a matter of law when the limitations period 
began to run by the evidence presented.  Accordingly, summary 
judgment must be denied.”   
 
 When it denied Safeway’s summary judgment motion, the trial court wrote: 
“While Defendant might be considered a health care provider 
pursuant to MICRA in some circumstances, the court does not find 
                                              
 3Fong was a licensed pharmacist, although being licensed was not a requirement 
of his position.   
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that Defendant is a health care provider for purposes of MICRA 
under all circumstances. 
 
As to the claims that Defendant failed to provide a medication guide 
and consultation, MICRA applies because these claims are ‘directly 
related to the professional services provided by a health care provider 
acting in its capacity as such.’  [Citation.]  Plaintiffs concede this in 
arguing that the one year statute of limitations does not bar their 
claims.  In opposition, Plaintiffs have raised triable issues of fact as to 
whether they are entitled to apply the ‘discovery rule’ for delayed 
accrual of the claims as to Defendant.  ‘The discovery rule provides 
that the accrual date of a cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff 
is aware of her injury and its negligent cause.’  (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & 
Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1109.) 
 
As to claims arising from Defendant’s corporate decision to provide 
all patients a five paragraph ‘short form’ monograph, rather than an 
eight paragraph ‘long form’ monograph, thereby omitting warnings 
regarding medications, the court finds that Defendant has not 
established that MICRA applies. 
 
The court finds that triable issues of fact exist as to whether these 
actions were ‘directly related to the professional services provided by 
a health care provider acting in its capacity as such.’  [Citation.]  
Logically, the decision does not appear to have been directly related.  
Further, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence that raises triable issues of 
fact as to whether this was a business decision completely unrelated 
to providing professional services as a health care provider.” 
 
 Petitioners challenged the denial of their respective summary judgment 
motions with the petitions for writ of mandate pending before this court.4  On April 
17, 2014 we requested informal opposition and notified the parties that we were 
considering the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance, pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 and Palma v. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. 
                                              
 4Not directly related to the issues raised by these petitions, defendants, PDX, Inc. 
filed an appeal of the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.  (See Hardin v. PDX, Inc. 
(A137035).)   
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(1984) 36 Cal.3d 171.  Having carefully reviewed the informal briefing, for the 
reasons stated below, we now issue a peremptory writ directing the trial court to 
grant petitioners’ motions for summary judgment.   
DISCUSSION 
I.  WRIT RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
 A trial court’s decision denying a motion for summary judgment is properly 
reviewed by a timely petition for a writ of mandate.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, 
subd. (m)(1); American Internat. Underwriters Agency Corp. v. Superior Court 
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1357, 1362.)  Writ review of a superior court order is 
appropriate under various criteria, including situations where, as here, the lower 
court’s order is both clearly erroneous and substantially prejudices the petitioner’s 
case.  (See Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 
1273–1274.)  In this case, petitioners would be substantially prejudiced if 
compelled to go through trial when the statute of limitations bars the suit against 
them.  Our review is de novo.  (Monticello Ins. Co. v. Essex Ins. Co. (2008) 162 
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385.)   
II.  THE “DELAYED DISCOVERY” RULE DOES NOT OPERATE TO MAKE 
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST JAMIESON OR PAFMG TIMELY.   
 
 Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an action for 
professional negligence against a health care provider must be brought no later 
than the earlier of (1) three years from the date of injury or (2) one year after the 
plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury.  (Code Civ. Pro., § 340.5.)  Thus, we must consider how 
soon after awakening from her coma should Hardin have known she was injured 
by her use of Lamotrigine.   
 As explained by the California Supreme Court, a “plaintiff discovers the 
cause of action when he at least suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal 
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theory, for its elements, even if he lacks knowledge thereof—when, simply put, he 
at least ‘suspects . . . that someone has done something wrong’ to him  . . . ‘wrong’ 
being used, not in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with its ‘lay 
understanding.’ . . .  He has reason to discover the cause of action when he has 
reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements. . . . He has reason to 
suspect when he has ‘ “ ‘ “notice or information of circumstances to put a 
reasonable person on inquiry” ’ ” ’ (. . . italics in original); he need not know the 
‘specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish’ the cause of action; rather, he may seek to 
learn such facts through the ‘process contemplated by pretrial discovery’; but, 
within the applicable limitations period, he must indeed seek to learn the facts 
necessary to bring the cause of action in the first place — he ‘cannot wait for’ them 
‘to find’ him and ‘sit on’ his ‘rights’; he ‘must go find’ them himself if he can and 
‘file suit’ if he does.”  (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397–398 
(citations and footnotes omitted).)  “The test is whether the plaintiff has 
information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or 
has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her 
investigation.  (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)  Being put on 
notice does not mean necessarily that the plaintiff has complete information; rather 
there must simply be “a connection between the facts discovered and the further 
facts to be discovered that the former may be said to furnish a reasonable and 
natural clue to the latter.”  (West v. Great Western Power Co. of California (1940) 
36 Cal.App.2d 403, 407.)   
 A.  Claims Brought by Hardin 
 In June 2010 when she awoke from her coma, Hardin was informed that she 
had SJS and TENs, which had been caused by the Lamotrigine.  She also knew at 
that time that she had not been warned about those or similarly severe side effects 
of the medication when it was prescribed or provided to her.  Her husband, both 
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from his own research and from his discussion with Dr. Berger, learned in April 
2010 that the drug likely caused his wife’s injuries.  In other words, as of April 
2010 Dane knew that his wife’s conditions had been reported as adverse reactions 
to Lamotrigine, and in June 2010, Hardin  knew her injuries were caused by the 
drug.   
 On these facts, we can only conclude that by July 2010 a reasonable person 
would have been put on notice to investigate the situation further.  To be certain—
in April 2010—one reasonable person, Dane, did so.5  But more importantly, by 
June 2010 Hardin had information that Lamotrigine caused her condition that 
should have led naturally and directly to her asking about what was known 
concerning these adverse reactions.  The urgent care doctor, whom she saw when 
she began to experience symptoms, told her to stop taking the Lamotrigine 
immediately.  This strongly suggests the doctor was aware of a possible link 
between Lamotrigine and the types of symptoms Hardin was experiencing. 
Furthermore, when a reasonable person awakens from a coma and learns that a 
medication caused her condition, one would expect her to inquire whether the side 
effects of the medication were common or previously known.   
 This case is analogous to Christ v. Lipsitz (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 894, 898 
where a wife’s pregnancy did not conclusively prove that a man’s vasectomy had 
been ineffective, but suggested the possibility, thereby triggering the duty to 
investigate.  Just as the Christs’ case was barred because of their failure promptly 
to investigate the effectiveness of the husband’s vasectomy once there was a 
                                              
 5In reviewing the denial of a summary judgment motion we do not make 
credibility determinations such as whether it is plausible, as stated by Hardin, for her to 
have suffered a debilitating effect of a medication, for her husband to know that it was a 
reported adverse effect, for them to have discussed her condition when she awoke from a 
coma, and for him not to have told her that she suffered known adverse reactions.  
Accepting those facts to be true, however, we view them as evidence that at the very 
least, Hardin made an unreasonably limited inquiry into her situation. 
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reason to believe he fathered a child after his vasectomy, so too is Hardin’s case 
barred by her failure to investigate the possibility that the adverse effects she 
suffered from Lamotrigine were generally known in the medical community once 
she was aware the medicine caused her condition.     
 1.  The “Continuous Treatment” Rule Does Not Make Hardin’s Claims 
Timely. 
 When a patient continues to receive care from a doctor after the date of the 
alleged malpractice, the patient is generally excused from diligently determining 
the cause of his or her injury.  (See e.g., Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 
777–778.)  This rule is premised upon the doctor’s continuing duty to disclose the 
full extent of a patient’s injuries and any likely future disability.  Anything the 
doctor does to conceal those facts and prevent the patient from consulting other 
doctors is deemed to be a fraud perpetrated by the doctor against the patient and 
excuses a lack of diligence on the part of the patient.  There are two reasons, 
however, why this rule does not apply here to excuse Hardin’s lack of diligence. 
 First, in construing a prior version of section 340.5 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, our Supreme Court held that the provision excusing a lack of diligence 
during nondisclosure by the health care provider applied only to the limitations 
period triggered by the date of injury and not to the one-year period triggered by 
the discovery of the alleged malpractice or when it should have been discovered 
had the plaintiff used reasonable diligence.  (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital 
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 93.)  The Court emphasized that applying the continuous 
treatment exception to the period triggered by the actual discovery of the 
malpractice or its discovery through reasonable diligence would unreasonably, but 
indefinitely, suspend the limitations period even in cases where the plaintiff 
actually discovered or should have discovered the basis of a potential suit.  The 
Court considered such a result “seemingly at odds with common sense” and 
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concluded that “[t]he mere statement of [the result] argues against its acceptance.”  
(Id. at 98.)  Although the Sanchez court was interpreting a pre-1975 version of 
section 340.5, its logic remains valid.  Thus, we decline to hold that the 
“continuous treatment” rule saves Hardin’s causes of action for professional 
medical negligence. 
 2.  Hardin Was Not Continuously Under Jamieson’s Care 
 In addition, from April 27, 2010 through July 16, 2010, Hardin’s condition 
was not diagnosed and treated by Jamieson, but by doctors at the Urgent Care 
Center in Santa Cruz, Dominican Hospital, and Santa Clara Valley Medical Center.  
Although Hardin continued under Jamieson’s care after July 16, 2010, she had 
ample opportunity to discuss her condition with other physicians, including Dr. 
Berger, who had initially instructed her to stop taking the Lamotrigine and who 
directly told Dane that his wife’s SJS was caused by the Lamotrigine.  After 
coming out of her coma in June 2010 Hardin remained hospitalized, i.e., under the 
care of other doctors, until July 16, 2010, giving her ample opportunity to discuss 
her situation with them.  Notwithstanding the fact that Hardin resumed receiving 
medical care from Jamieson after her hospitalization, she was not precluded in any 
way from obtaining the relevant information directly from the doctors who treated 
her in the Santa Cruz Urgent Care Center, Dominican Hospital, and/or Santa Clara 
Valley Medical Center.  Thus, the level of diligence she should have shown in 
reasonably pursuing her claim should not be excused because she returned to 
Jamieson’s care after her hospitalization. 
 Accordingly, the statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure section 
340.5, bars Hardin’s claims against both Jamieson and the Medical Group.  
Hardin’s complaint was not filed until October 18, 2011, more than a year from the 
latest possible date in June 2010 when she knew or should have known of her 
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injuries from Lamotrigine.  Thus, her claims for professional negligence were not 
timely. 
 B.  Dane’s Claims Are Also Untimely.   
 Dane, of course, was on inquiry notice as of April 27, 2010, because he 
discovered  the facts concerning his wife’s injuries as of that date.  His complaint, 
also was not filed until October 18, 2011.  He cites Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990) 
222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1067, for the proposition that notwithstanding the one-year 
limitations period his loss of consortium claim is timely because it is derivative of 
his wife’s claims.  Blain, however, simply stands for the proposition that where a 
plaintiff who suffered the primary injury cannot state a valid tort claim, his or her 
spouse cannot claim loss of consortium.  (Ibid.)  Admittedly, Dane’s loss of 
consortium claim is derivative of Hardin’s in the sense that it arises out of her 
injuries.  However, it is an independent legal claim.  (See Leonard v. John Crane, 
Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1279–1280 [“While joinder of a loss of 
consortium claim with the injured spouse’s personal injury claim is encouraged, it 
is not mandatory and a loss of consortium claim may be maintained 
independently.”].)  Because Dane’s loss of consortium claim is separate and 
distinct from his Hardin’s, the time period for him to have brought his claim began 
accruing April 27, 2010.  Thus the October 18, 2011 complaint was untimely as to 
Dane as well.6   
                                              
 6Even if we accepted Dane’s theory—which we reject—his claims would still be 
untimely because it is premised on the notion that a loss of consortium claim is timely 
when the underlying tort claim is timely.  Here, as discussed above, Hardin’s underlying 
claim is untimely. 
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III.  ALL THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SAFEWAY FALL WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE AND ARE, THUS, BARRED BY 
SECTION 340.5’S ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.   
 
 In denying Safeway’s summary judgment motion, the trial court divided the 
claims against Safeway into those based on conduct which occurred in the course 
of Safeway’s capacity as a health care provider, such as not providing an adequate  
medication guide and consultation, and acts and decisions which were made in 
Safeway’s corporate capacity, such as the decision to provide patients with an 
abbreviated monograph.  With respect to the former, the court found that the 
Hardins raised triable issues of fact concerning the applicability of the delayed 
discovery rule.  We reject application of the delayed discovery rule to Safeway’s 
conduct for the same reasons we have rejected the claims against the Medical 
Group and Jamieson.  The Hardins’ delay in investigating the potential claims or 
filing suit was unreasonable.  Thus the delayed discovery rule does not apply to toll 
the limitations period. 
 We also must reject the superior court’s bifurcation of the claims against 
Safeway into claims of professional negligence rooted in malpractice and ordinary 
negligence, rooted in Safeway’s corporate decision-making.7  For purposes of 
deciding a summary judgment motion, the pleadings set the boundaries of the 
dispute.  (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 499.)  
Paragraphs 26 through 28 of the complaint allege the Hardins’ negligence claim 
against Safeway.  The thrust of paragraph 27 accuses Safeway of providing Hardin 
with a dangerous drug without warning her about Lamotrigine and the risks 
associated with taking Lamotrigine and Effexor simultaneously.  These allegations 
fall squarely within section 340.5’s definition of professional negligence, i.e., “a 
                                              
 7If the statute of limitations for ordinary negligence were to apply, the Hardins 
would have two years to bring this claim.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.)   
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negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of 
professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal 
injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of 
services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction 
imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5, 
subd. (2).)   
 The closest the complaint comes to mentioning any “corporate” act by 
Safeway is the allegation that Safeway was negligent by “hiring, buying, 
purchasing drug literature from Defendant Wolters Kluwer, Inc. to be provided to 
Safeway customers without reviewing, supervising, correcting, and/or determining 
whether or not the said literature was accurate and contained all warnings that 
should have been given to customers when the said drug was dispensed . . . .”  
However, this allegation does not reflect the record before us on summary 
judgment.  Safeway contracted with PDX to use the abbreviated monograph.  If 
anything, this was as a means to save money or employee time.  But this decision 
was, at most, a contributing factor to the failure of Safeway to provide Hardin 
adequate warnings when her prescriptions were filled by Safeway pharmacies.  
This resulting failure to warn Hardin of the dangers associated with Lamotrigine 
cannot be fairly characterized as anything other than professional negligence. 
 A defendant’s actions towards a plaintiff are measured by one standard of 
care, even if the plaintiff attempts to articulate multiple theories of liability.  
(Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 
995, 998 [pleadings stated causes of action for both ordinary and professional 
negligence, where a patient fell off a gurney that did not have its rails raised, 
reversed because a defendant is only subject to a single standard of care.].)  In 
Bellamy v. Appellate Department (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 797 a patient fell when 
she was left unattended and unsecured on an X-ray table.  The hospital claimed 
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that the action was barred by the limitations period for personal injury.  (Id. at 
799.)  The court of appeal, however, held that the complaint alleged professional 
negligence, bringing it within the purview of MICRA because the fall occurred in 
the course of the hospital’s rendering professional services.  (Id. at 806.)  The 
hospital’s professional duty encompassed mundane acts such as securing the 
patient while on the x-ray table.  So too, here.   
 Safeway cites persuasive authority, Taylor v. United States (9th Cir. 1987) 
821 F.2d 1428, interpreting California law.  There a hospital patient suffered 
permanent brain damage when his ventilator was disconnected for an undisclosed 
reason.  The Ninth Circuit determined that MICRA applied even if the ventilator 
was disconnected as a result of such non-treatment-related causes as a janitor 
bumping a broom into the patient’s bed.  (Id. at 1432.)  It was the hospital’s 
professional duty to prevent the patient from becoming separated from the 
ventilator, and that duty was breached regardless of the reason the ventilator 
detached from the patient.  
 The Hardins rely on So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, and Atienza v. 
Taub (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 388, to argue that conduct furthering a health care 
provider’s self-interest, such as Safeway’s profit motive here, does not fall within 
the scope of rendering professional services.  Both cases are readily distinguishable 
from this one.  In So, an angry doctor was sued after she tried to intimidate a 
patient by shoving a vial containing the patient’s blood and tissue at her, and then 
demanded that the patient not tell anyone about it.  The patient sued for negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery.  In these 
circumstances, the appellate court held the doctor was being sued for acts that were 
outside the scope of rendering professional services.  Thus, her complaint was not 
time barred under section 340.5.  (So v. Shin, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 662–
673.) 
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 In Atienza v. Taub, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 388, a patient sued a doctor after 
she had an illicit affair with him.  The court concluded she had no cause of action 
for professional negligence where the facts demonstrated that the doctor’s 
seduction of the patient had nothing to do with his rendering medical treatment.  
Thus, in both cases relied upon by the Hardins the wrongdoing by health care 
providers occurred outside the scope of the provision of professional services.  The 
Hardins’ claim against Safeway is different.  Whatever may have been Safeway’s 
motive in using the abbreviated monograph, the Hardins are suing Safeway for the 
omission of information that should have been provided them when Safeway 
dispensed the prescribed medication.  In other words, Safeway is being sued for 
deficiencies within the scope of its professional responsibilities as a pharmacy. 
 Thus, the allegations against Safeway all fall within MICRA’s purview.  
Because the complaint alleges professional negligence against Safeway, it is 
subject to the limitations period described in section 340.5, and is untimely for the 
same reasons as the Hardins’ claims against the Medical Group and Jamieson. 
CONCLUSION 
 Where “petitioner’s entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could 
reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue,” the accelerated Palma 
procedure is appropriate.  (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; Palma, 
supra 36 Cal.3d 171.)  As the Hardins point out, “[t]hese petitions do not involve a 
novel issue.”  We agree.  After applying long-established principles to undisputed 
facts, the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate.   
 Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue remanding this matter to the 
respondent superior court and directing the superior court to vacate its orders 
denying the summary judgment motions of petitioners Safeway, Inc., Palo Alto 
Foundation Medical Group, and Sharon S. Jamieson, M.D., dated March 14, 2014, 
and to issue new orders granting those motions. 
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 All parties shall bear their own costs. 
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